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TOWNSHEND V TOWNSHEND & BUTTAR 






This comment looks at two fairly recent decisions by the Ontario 
Court of Appeal, Townshend v Townshend (2012 ONCA 868) 
and Buttar v Buttar (2013 ONCA 617) with respect to the courts' 
handling of the exclusion of gifts under section 4(2) of Ontario's 
Family Law Act (RSO 1990, c F.3). In Ontario, gifts made by 
third parties outside the marriage to one spouse may be 
excluded from the calculation of a spouse's Net Family Property 
(NFP). Property may cease to be excludable if it is not kept 
separate or if it is used to the benefit of the family. In both 
Townshend and Buttar, the court had to grapple with fungible 
gifts and decide to what degree the gifts should be excluded from 
the NFP calculations. In both decisions, the courts relied upon 
a line of reasoning that placed too much weight on the intentions 
of the donor when deciding whether (or to what extent) to 
exclude the gifts while simultaneously undervaluing the 
subsequent behaviour of the donees after delivery of the gift. One 
worry these decisions raise is that, if donees of gifts may rely 
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merely on the fact of a gift and not on their actions subsequent 
to delivery of the gift, litigants will become emboldened to find 
far more “gifts” among their property. Even more worrisome, 
however, is that the courts may be willing to grant exclusions 
regardless of post-delivery behaviour and thereby undermine 
the purpose of the NFP calculations: namely, as the preamble of 
the Family Law Act says, to allow the court to order an 
“equitable settlement of the affairs of the spouses”. 
 
§. 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Under Ontario’s Family Law Act (FLA; or the Act), one may 
exclude gifts received from third parties from the equalization 
process.1 Two recent decisions of the Ontario Court of Appeal 
illustrate some of the problems this exclusion can pose. Because 
gifts are presumptively excluded from a (former) spouse's net 
family property, it makes good economic sense to characterize 
one's assets as gifts. Excluding gifts from the equalization 
process also makes intuitive sense when the gift was made by a 
third party to one of the spouses. For though we may marry, our 
individuality and autonomy is not thereby irrevocably lost. If 
nothing else, a gift, to me, is a sign that we still recognize and 
value the individual in the partnership, the “me” in “team”. By 
allowing gifts to be excluded from the calculation of family 
assets and from being shared at marriage breakdown, the 
legislature has signalled that, although individuals may be joined 
in a family (ad)venture, their individuality is never fully 
“comingled” and lost. Excluding gifts from the equalization 
process, then, would seem to be both natural and reasonable. 
 
 Still, the law has a remarkable power to complicate even 
the simplest of matters. The equalization process under the FLA 
is meant to be mechanical and predictable. Compared to other 
provinces where property is divided, judges in Ontario are 
                                                 
1  Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F.3, s 4(2) [FLA]. 
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supposed to have firmer checks on their discretion.2  Gifts, too, 
are meant to be a simple matter. We give gifts all the time 
without judicial oversight. Yet, because gifts to one spouse 
during a marriage can have important consequences for how 
family property will be handled by the courts where spouses 
cannot agree how to divide their assets, gifts easily become hotly 
contested. We should not lose sight of the role the courts play in 
this process, for it is not merely a question of determining 
whether a gift was made. When a court declares a valuable asset 
is or is not a gift, the effect of that decision²implicitly, if not 
explicitly²is to foreground the relative importance of 
individual autonomy or familial interdependence. The analyses 
of Buttar v. Buttar and Townshend v. Townshend3 are both 
problematic in the way they assess gifts and whether they should 
be excluded, and the balance between individual and family is 
upset as a result.  
  
 The problem in both cases is how the courts treat the 
intentions of the donors. A donor's intentions do matter. One 
must intend a gift to make a gift. The donor's intentions do three 
important things: they indicate that a gift was made, what the 
gift is, and to whom the gift was made. What the donor's 
intentions do not do is indicate how the gift may be used. A gift 
is not a contract4 and one may not, generally, impose conditions 
on the use of the gift once ownership has passed. The recipient, 
                                                 
2 See Schreyer v Schreyer, 2011 SCC 35, [2011] 2 SCR 605 at para 15; 
Mary Jane Mossman et al, Families and the Law: Cases and 
Commentary, 2nd ed (Concord, Ont: Captus Press, 2015) at 471±2. 
3 Buttar v Buttar, 2013 ONCA 617, 116 OR (3d) 481 [Buttar]; 
Townshend v Townshend, 2012 ONCA 868, 113 OR (3d) 321 
[Townshend]. These cases concern not only gifts, but gifts at the time 
of marriage breakdown. 
4 Richard Hyland, Gifts: A Study of Comparative Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009) §§ 1315±6, 1324 (noting that common law 
regimes reject the civil law view of gifts as contracts). 
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or donee, may accede to the donor's wishes as a matter of logic 
or morality, but, from a legal perspective, the coincidence of the 
donor's intentions and the recipient's post-delivery actions are 
just that a coincidence. Thus, it is important to recognize when 
the donor's intentions no longer matter for the purposes of the 
Act. Once the gift has been made, it is the intentions and actions 
of the recipient that matter. If a gift is to be excluded from the 
(original) recipient's assets in the family law context, it should 
not be because of what the donor intended. A court should pay 
little to no heed to the donor's intentions. Arguably, presuming 
the intentions of the donor were to benefit the individual and not 
the couple, if we treat a donor's intentions as having any legal 
meaning beyond determining that a gift was made, it will usually 
come at the cost of a corresponding de-emphasis on the 
recipient's intentions and actions post-delivery. The result is a 
privileging of the individual over the couple, which may be what 
a party wants while litigating their separation, but not 
necessarily what their intentions were during the marriage. 
Surely the time that matters most for determining how gifts 
should be treated pursuant to the Act comes not before the gift 
was made, and not after a marriage breaks down, but the time in 
between. 
 
 The Act describes the treatment of gifts in a deceptively 
straightforward manner. Under the FLA, subsection 4(2), it is 
clear that gifts following the date of marriage may be excluded 
from the calculation of a spouse’s net family property  
this may even include any income generated from the gift.5 At 
                                                 
5   Net family property is defined at FLA, supra note 1, s 4(1): 
 “net family property” means the value of all the property, except 
property described in subsection (2), that a spouse owns on the 
valuation date, after deducting,  
(a) the spouse’s de ts and other lia ilities, and  
(b) the value of property, other than a matrimonial home, that the      
spouse owned on the date of the marriage, after deducting the 
spouse’s de ts and other lia ilities, other than de ts or lia ilities 
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common law, it is generally thought that there are only three 
basic requirements for an inter vivos gift: (i) the donor must 
intend to make a gift, (ii) the would-be recipient of the gift the 
donee must accept the gift, and (iii) control over the gift must 




                                                 
related directly to the acquisition or significant improvement of a 
matrimonial home, calculated as of the date of the marriage  “ iens 
familiaux nets”  
 FLA, supra note 1, s 4(2) reads, in part: 
 The value of the following property that a spouse owns on the valuation 
date does not form part of the spouse’s net family property   
1. Property, other than a matrimonial home, that was acquired by gift 
or inheritance from a third person after the date of the marriage.  
2. Income from property referred to in paragraph 1, if the donor or 
testator has expressly stated that it is to be excluded from the 
spouse’s net family property.  
 [ . . . ]  
5. Property, other than a matrimonial home, into which property 
referred to in paragraphs 1 to 4 can be traced. 
6 See e.g. McNamee v McNamee, 2011 ONCA 533, 106 OR (3d) 401 at 
para 24 [McNamee]. See also Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 
5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) at 156-66. Cf Mary Jane Mossman & 
Philip Girard, Property Law: Cases and Commentary, 3rd ed (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery, 2014) at 430 1. 




Table 1: Examples of Equalization Payment with a Gift Deduction. 
 
 In Ontario, the determination that some asset was a gift 
to only one of the spouses can radically revise the equalization 
payment one spouse owes to the other. Rather than divide a 
family’s property and assets directly, the ct attempts to achieve 
a just and fair result by calculating a dollar value of each 
spouse’s  and directing the spouse ith the larger alance to 
pay one-half of the difference to the other spouse.7 In the 
simplest scenario, if one can deduct a sizeable gift from their 
NFP, then one will become entitled to either a decrease or 
increase of 50% of the value of the gift in the equalization 
payment they will give or receive. In some cases, it is possible 
that exclusions of gifts will mean that the other spouse must 
provide the equalization payment rather than receive one (see 
Table 1 for a simplistic illustration8). In other words, excluding 
gifts can significantly affect what constitutes the just and fair 
division of property that is meant to flo  from the “equal 
contri ution” of the spouses during the marriage.9  
                                                 
7 FLA, supra note 1, s 5(1). 
8 Note that the tables are written only to highlight the net “real orld” 
effect a gift has on the NFP: strictly speaking, excluded gifts are never 
truly a part of one’s . 
9 See FLA, supra note 1, s 5(7) (stressing how marriages are comprised 
of “equal contri ution s ” hich is the reason s deserve 




 Both Townshend and Buttar illustrate some of the 
problems gifts pose for the Ontarian regime of equalization. In 
what follows, I shall outline the relevant circumstances of each 
decision (§. 2) and the reasons for the decisions (§. 3 and §. 4), 
before turning to an analysis of the deeper issues (§. 5). The last 
sections explore the impact (§. 6) and, by way of conclusion, the 
broader policy implications of these two decisions (§. 7).  
 
§. 2. FACTS & ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT 
 
In Townshend, the husband appealed an equalization payment 
order. The appeal came after a long marriage of 33 years ended 
in separation in 2005.10 At trial, the judge had ordered the wife 
to pay the husband an equalization payment of $31,368.08,11 
which is $3,631.92 less than the $35,000 partial indemnity cost 
award made in favour of the wife.12 One must surely wonder 
whether the costs of the trial, weighed against the equalization 
payment, influenced the hus and’s decision to appeal.  
 
 For Mr. Townshend, the issues on appeal related to the 
calculation of his NFP. These included:  
 
1. A claim for an $8,500 credit with respect to 
a one-acre parcel of land;  
2. An inter vivos gift valued at $25,000;  
3. A 1967 Buick, which (he claimed) was a  
 gift;  
4. A GMAC car loan;  
                                                 
equalization). 
10 Townshend, supra note 3 at para 1. 
11 Townshend v Townshend, 2010 ONSC 6405, [2010] OJ No 5369 (QL) 
at para 63 [Townshend ONSC]. In the Court of Appeal the amount is 
said to have been one cent less; see Townshend, supra note 3 at para 2. 
12 Ibid at paras 2, 55. 
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5. he ife’s claim for a deduction of a 
$12,000 debt owed to her parents; and  
6. A claim regarding the hall stand (later 
abandoned during oral argument). 
 
In the subsequent sections, the focus shall be on the $25,000 gift. 
 
 Approximately half a year after Townshend, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal released its decision for Buttar, which partly 
considered similar issues. Separation again came after a long 
marriage of 36 years.13 The facts are a little more involved in this 
case. The parties married in 1972 and built a home together on a 
property o ned y the hus and’s family the follo ing year. n 
1978, his parents gave the couple the property on which the 
house was built.14 The following year, Mr. Buttar's parents 
“transferred o nership and control” of the farming usiness to 
the couple; this included another property, referred to as the 
“ ome ain farm”. hey also sold their son livestoc  for 
, , and “gifted to him  alone” a 5,970 kg milk quota. Of 
particular significance was that the parents were careful and 
intentional in these transactions. The milk quota was structured 
as a gift in order to gain certain tax benefits.15 The motivation 
was to avoid paying various taxes that would otherwise be 
required if the milk quota were not given as a gift. Over time, 
the Buttars acquired further properties, bringing the total to six, 
along with a time-share interest in a Collingwood property, and 
an increasingly large milk quota (27,561 kg).16 In addition to the 
individual assets each person held, the milk quota sufficed to pay 
off the remaining debt the family had owed to Farm Credit 
Canada with a surplus of $358,253.46. Other farm equipment 
                                                 
13 Buttar, supra note 3 at para 1. 
14 Ibid at para . ote that the court rote that “the parties” ere given 
the property. 
15 Ibid at para 5. 
16 Ibid at paras 6 10. 
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was bought and sold following the date of separation.17 
 
 In the final years of the marriage, Ms. Buttar worked 
only sporadically at a local service club, earning less than $3,000 
per year. Two bouts with cancer (1989 and 2006) made work 
involving heavy manual labour difficult.18 Following the 
separation, the farm business seemed to prosper. Mr. Buttar's tax 
return for 2010 approached $900,000. However, he anticipated 
a drastic reduction in his income after the dairy operation ended 
in 2010, and suggested it might be less than $20,000 per year. 
He ceased his $2000 monthly payment of spousal support at that 
time.19 
 
 The court of appeal addressed a number of issues in light 
of this complicated sequence of events (many, it may be noted, 
taking place after the date of separation). These were:  
 
1. Whether the appellant, Mr. Buttar, could   
deduct the present value of the disposition 
costs, including the capital gains tax, that he 
would    incur when he sells the properties;  
2. Whether the 1979 milk quota may be 
excluded from his NFP;  
3. How much spousal support is owed to the 
respondent; and  
4. Whether and how the jointly-owned 
properties should be distributed.20 
 
Our focus in what follows is the second issue.  
 
                                                 
17 Ibid at paras 10±11. 
18 Ibid at para 12. 
19 Ibid at para 13. 
20 Ibid at para 14. 
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§. 3. REASONS IN TOWNSHEND 
 
Mr. Townshend claimed an exclusion for a $25,000 gift, which 
was deposited (by the wife, he alleged) into a joint bank account. 
In the court below, Justice Kruzick, had accepted that the gift 
had been made to the husband alone.21 But, crucially for him, the 
deposit into the joint account robbed the gift of its exclusive 
nature.22 It became, in effect, a gift to the family. Ultimately, 
there was no exclusion, and both spouses were to enjoy the 
benefit of the gift equally. That is, the $25,000 benefited each 
spouse by the same absolute amount (compare columns 1 and 3 
in Table 2, below, for a fictional illustration). If one is of the 
view that a deposit into a joint account signals an intention to 
enefit the family equally, then ustice ruzic ’s decision 
makes sense.  
 
Justice Simmons did not agree. Like Kruzick J., Justice 
Simmons did not accept that the money was deposited in a joint 
account contrary to Mr. o nshend’s ishes or that he as 
unaware of the deposit.23 Nonetheless, she concluded that the 
hus and should have received an exclusion for “one-half of the 
amount of the gift”.24 Although apparently uneasy with it, 
Justice Simmons relied on the popular interpretation of Colletta 
v. Colletta:25 hen something is “deposited into a joint account 
it loses its exclusionary character to the extent of the one-half 
interest that is presumed to e gifted to the spouse”.26 Her 
reading of the Act is that a court must determine ownership prior 
                                                 
21 Townshend ONSC, supra note 11 at para 44. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Townshend, supra note 3 at para 19. 
24 Ibid at para 20. 
25 Colletta v Colletta, [1993] OJ No 2537, 50 RFL (3d) 1 (CA). For her 
hesitations, see Townshend, supra note 3 at paras 27 28. 
26 Ibid at para 28. 
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to calculating the spouses’ .27 Section 4(2) of the FLA 
stresses that certain property that one in fact “o ns . . . does not 
form part of the spouse’s net family property”.28 As already 
mentioned, gifts from after the marriage can be excluded, as can 
gifts hich can e “traced” into other property.29  
 
 
Table 2: Consequences of Decisions of Kruzick J and Simmons JA. 
 
 Although it is not stated outright, it seems that Justice 
Simmons relied on the tracing exclusion.30 The $25,000 
ultimately resided in an account that held $31,000 on the date of 
separation about nine months after the deposit.31 In this case, 
and due to the fungible nature of money, it is easy to find, if one 
ishes, that the entire ,  is “still” in the joint account. And 
Justice Simmons was willing to make that determination. More 
                                                 
27 See McNamee, supra note 6 at paras 56 63, cited by Simmons J in 
Townshend, supra note 3 at para 28. 
28 FLA, supra note 1, s 4(2); Cf McNamee, supra note 6 at para 65. 
29 FLA, supra note 1, s 4(2) #5; the text is partially reproduced supra note 
5. 
30 Cf Townshend, supra note 3 at para 35. On tracing, see Ilana I 
yl erman  Brian  Bur e, “ racing Exclusions in amily a ” 
(2006) 25:1 Can Fam LQ 67. 
31 Ibid at para 34. 
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questionably, she rejected the suggestion that it would be better 
to analyze the actual credits and debits of the joint account to 
determine hether the “gift could e traced into the funds that 
remained in that account” on the date of separation.32  
 
 While it is likely true that producing and analysing such 
bank accounts would complicate and prolong cases such as 
these, drawing the ratio that one need not do so when dealing in 
specie is not without problems. It was easy in this case because 
the disputed amount as “still” availa le. fter all, ,  is 
less than $31,000. But what if the amounts had been reversed? 
As noted above, Justice Simmons decided that one-half of the 
gift may be excluded even if deposited into a joint account. What 
would happen if the gift had been $31,000 but only $25,000 were 
left (for example, imagine $6000 had been invested in 
improvements to the matrimonial home)? Half of the gift
$15,500 would still be in the joint account. Should that be 
excluded and the remaining $9,500 be divided into each 
spouse’s  ould there ever e a situation here the entire 
remaining $25,000 would be considered a gift that one might 
exclude? Would that even make sense if some of the gift had 
been spent to benefit the family? It is not clear what the right 
answer is.33 ustice immons’ decision is unhelpful and provides 
no guidance if part of the gift is no longer clearly available in the 
way it is in Townshend. Indeed, it would only get more 
complicated if the interest on the value of the (excluded portion) 
of the gift were excluded as well pursuant to the FLA, subsection 
4(2), paragraph 2.  
 
                                                 
32 Ibid at para , such an approach is re ected as “overly formalistic”. 
33 But see Ho v Ho, 1 RFL (4th) 340, 1993 CarswellOnt 287 (WL) at 
paras 24  ife a le to “trace” ,  of a ,  gift from her 
father-in-law; entitled only to deduct that amount as the rest had been 
“comingled ith the other funds to such an extent that it is not possible 
to trace the items claimed y the ife” . or other decisions on related 
matters, see Zylberman & Burke, supra note 30 at 92 99. 
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 Of course, as the calculated NFP is merely a notional 
value, one solution might be to say that the donee is entitled to 
deduct one-half the value of the gift regardless of how the other 
property and finances of the former spouses line up. That is, the 
criticism above is only about the complexities of realizing the 
equalization payment; but it is not any more complicated to use 
the above ratio to determine the amount that may be excluded 
pursuant to a gift that was deposited into a joint account. Half of 
$31,000, in the end, is no more difficult to compute than half of 
$25,000. Yet, another problem remains. In fact, the consequence 
of allowing the original donee to deduct one-half the value of the 
gift from his or her  results in the donee ending up in “real 
orld” terms  ith three-quarters of the benefit of the gift 
notwithstanding the arguably clear act of conjoining or 
comingling the gift with the other shared assets of the (former) 
family. The middle column of Table 2, above, helps illustrate the 
point. What it shows is that the beneficiary of the gift, despite 
his or her deposit into a joint account, ends up with 75% of the 
value of the gift.  
 
§. 4. REASONS IN BUTTAR 
 
In Buttar, the issues relate to the calculation of the spouses’  
and spousal support (my focus shall be on the respective NFP 
calculations). Justice Rosenberg ruled that the milk quota should 
not be excluded from Mr. Buttar's NFP, despite the fact that it 
was initially described as a gift to one party.34 Justice Rosenberg 
noted that the gift, or “transfer”, seemed to serve a purpose 
beyond what a simple gift might have, for, as he noted, the gift 
helped Mr. Buttar's father avoid various tax consequences.35 The 
gift lacked the altruism normally associated with gifts. It is hard 
                                                 
34 Buttar, supra note  at para  the quota “gifted to the appellant alone”  
the quota as structured “as a gift to his son” . 
35 Ibid at para 5; at para 26, Rosenberg J notes the application judge made 
the same determination. 
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to escape the conclusion that Justice Rosenberg is importing a 
concern with motivation into his analysis of intention.36  
 
 Justice Hatton, the application judge, found that because 
there was consideration for the transfer of the milk quota, which 
came in the form of a life interest in the family farm, it was not 
a gift.37  In addition, the judge was concerned that the milk quota 
had been subject to a series of transactions over the years. 
Notably, it had grown in size and value. The milk quota which 
had been sold in 2010, therefore, was due to the efforts of both 
spouses.38 Regarding the legal analysis of the requirements for a 
gift, Justice Rosenberg began his own analysis by stressing that 
gifts must be freely given. Altruism must be the central 
element.39 However, after exploring the legal requirements for a 
gift, which here turned on a question of whether there was 
consideration for the milk quota, he declined to overturn the 
application udge’s determination that consideration had een 
given. For Justice Rosenberg, this was a finding of fact that 
should only e overturned in a case of “palpa le and overriding 
error”,40 and, in his view, there was none on this point.41 
                                                 
36 See McNamee, supra note 6 at para 34 (holding that it is an error of 
law to conflate intention, which is a prerequisite for a gift, with the 
“underlying motivation or purpose” for the gift  Cf Hyland, supra note 
4 at § 288. The appellant in Buttar was alive to this issue: see Buttar, 
supra note 3 at para 30. 
37 Buttar, supra note 3 at para 26. I was unable to obtain a copy of Justice 
atton’s decision. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid at para 29, citing Peter v Beblow, [1993] 1 SCR 980, 101 DLR 
(4th) 621 at 991 92. 
40 Buttar, supra note 3 at para 33, citing Housen v Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 
33, [2002] 2 SCR 235 at para 10. 
41 This was not true of other aspects of the original decision. See e.g. 
Buttar, supra note 3 at paras 54, 57, 63, 65, 67, 71. 
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§. 5. ANALYSIS 
 
Jurists have long been suspicious of gifts,42 but they are a 
common part of everyday life. When legal difficulties over gift-
giving occur, it often relates to the requirement that the donor 
must surrender control or “deliver” the gift. n Townshend and 
Buttar, however, the problem for the courts seemed to be how 
much eight one should attach to the “true”  su ective 
intentions of the donor and/or donee.  
 
 This concern with intentions is surprising for a number 
of reasons. The most important is that, from a doctrinal 
perspective, the intentions of both parties are only important for 
determining that a gift was given (here the focus is on what 
might be called a simple gift: no trusts are being considered). 
Clearly, once the gift has been made, the intentions of the donor 
regarding the gifted item no longer have any legal force. This is 
hat the requirement that the gift e “delivered” is meant to 
show: that one has surrendered any legal claim over the gift.43 
While it is true that the donee may feel some residual obligation 
to follow the wishes of the donor, and there may indeed even be 
good reasons to follow those wishes, there is no longer any 
legally enforceable obligation. The obligation may be moral or 
rational, but it is not legal.  
 The intentions of the donee are likewise specific and 
                                                 
42 Nicholas Laurent-Bonne, Aux origines de la liberté de disposer entre 
époux (Issy-les- oulines  extenso ditions,  at  “ e discours 
des juristes révèle une m fiance instinctive  l’ gard des li eralit s, de 
quelque nature qu’elles soient, ainsi qu’en t moignent les solennit s 
particulières entourant, dans la plupart des législations occidentales, les 
donations, et ce depuis le droit romain tardif” . 
43 Delivery is also sometimes said to be necessary because there can be 
no consideration given in return for a gift (where consideration is 
meant to indicate that the offeree accepted the offeror’s terms . Cf Re 
Cole, [1964] 1 Ch 175 (CA), cited in Mossman and Girard, supra note 
6 at 432, and Ziff, supra note 6 at 157. 
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solely focused on the act of receiving the gift. It is doubtlessly 
true that the donee may have other ideas about what she will do 
ith the gift invest it, urn it, “re-gift” it, etc. , ut that is not 
the intention a court would assess directly for the purposes of 
determining whether there was an inter vivos gift. At best, such 
intentions about how the item will be disposed of in the future 
would be an indication that the person intended to receive the 
item as the donee of the gift. In this sense, the wording of the 
FLA, subsection 4(2), paragraph 2, may seem surprising:  
 
Income from property referred to in paragraph 1 
[i.e., a gift or inheritance] [may be excluded], if 
the donor or testator has expressly stated that it is 
to e excluded from the spouse’s net family 
property. 
 
 In this case, the law is clear that the intentions of the 
donor regarding the disposition of the gift (or inheritance) should 
survive the transfer of the gift. Although this may appear to be 
an example of “dead hand control”, it is a ustifia le provision. 
One important purpose this provision serves is that it allows a 
cash or fungible gift to operate in the same way the gift of a 
valuable item might. A valuable painting tends to appreciate 
over time, and when it is a gift being excluded under the FLA, 
subsection 4(2), it is the painting that is excluded, not the value 
of the painting on the day it was given. Thus, subsection 4(2), 
paragraph 2, allows fungible gifts the possibility of operating in 
the same way. One could imagine it as the gift-giver trying to 
give a gift that appreciates like a valuable painting might. In 
other words, the point is that the donor is given the authority to 
give the gift she intends to. he donor’s intentions, as discussed 
above, help us determine what the gift is, or, to put the matter 
differently, determine the scope of the gift. In that sense, it is not 
an example of “dead hand control” at all, ut a ay to counteract 
the (reasonable) default position that any consequent income 
from the gift will not be excluded unless it be explicitly so 
designated.  




 The problem with the Townshend decision, however, is 
that affords un ustifia le “dead hand control” to the donor at the 
expense of the post-delivery intentions of the donee. In fact, it 
should be the reverse. If the donee subsequently acts in a way 
that suggests that the gift is being used to benefit the family, it 
should no longer matter what the intentions of the gift-giver 
were. The donor (normally) is not in charge of the well-being of 
the family, and no longer has any “say” over ho  the gift can 
and cannot be used.44 Once the gift is received, the only intention 
that should matter is that of the donee, who has become the 
owner. In the case of Mr. Townshend, the questions that should 
have been asked were: (i) what was his intention regarding this 
gift? and (ii) what did he do with this gift?45 One might note, in 
passing, that the answers to these questions must include 
consideration of the donee’s intentions and actions prior to the 
breakdown of the marriage. It is usually all too easy to guess 
what they might be once litigation has begun. 
 
 The answers to these questions suggest that Justice 
ruzic ’s decision as the right one. t was not entirely clear 
who deposited the $25,000 into the joint account. 
                                                 
44 Cf Mackedie Estate v Mackedie, [1998] BCJ No 2200 (SC), cited in 
Mossman & Girard, supra note 6 at 438 (son, the donee, found to have 
received gifts where, post-delivery, the pictures were hung back on 
donor’s all and thus still in the donor’s “possession”  attempt y 
donor to leave paintings to someone else by will failed). 
45 For an example of a transfer to the other spouse, see e.g. Cartier v 
Cartier, 47 RFL (6th) 436, 2007 CanLII 52427 (Ont Sup Ct J) at para 
 “ hen a spouse transfers gifted or inherited property into oint 
names, thereby conferring an interest in the other spouse, the 
transferring spouse loses the exclusion only to the extent of the gift he 
or she made to the other spouse, provided that the result intended by 
the transfer is oint o nership.” emphasis in original . Of course, 
determining the intention of a donee-turned-donor spouse may not be 
straightforward. 
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Mr. Townshend suggested it was his spouse. Even if this were 
true, he not only let that action stand, but it appears that the 
money may have een su sequently transferred into a “ oint 
investment account”.46 With respect, when Justice Simmons 
writes that she can find no “legislative intent” regarding hether 
“the entire amount of the gift should lose its excluded character 
hen deposited into a oint an  account”,47 she has already 
started down the wrong track. It is true that the wording of the 
FLA seems to suggest that gifts can never stop being a gift. But 
the idea is preposterous. It only begins to make sense when the 
gift is of significant value and, possibly, when the gift was not 
made too long ago. The reason for this may well be because 
although separating spouses would not care much about a $100 
gift made five years ago, they likely will care a great deal about 
a $100,000 gift made 25 years ago. Regardless, depositing 
money into a “ oint investment” account should generally signal 
an intention to use that money to benefit the family.  
 
 In the case of Buttar v. Buttar, it is difficult to 
disentangle all the strands related to the milk quota. There are 
two issues that must be considered: (i) the fact that the milk 
quota did not stay the same size (i.e., 5,970 kg) from the time of 
the gift, and (ii) the relationship of the milk quota to the larger 
transfer.  
 
 Regarding the first issue, one might think the best way 
to approach the quota is to treat it as a good that can be traded in 
specie, much like money (and unlike, say, a painting). If so, then 
there would be no difficulty in reasoning along the lines adopted 
in Townshend. After all, 5,970 kg is less than 27,561 kg. The 
quota of 5,970 kg was worth $403,858.02 at the date of 
                                                 
46 Townshend ONSC, supra note 11 at para 44; Cf Townshend, supra note 
3 at para  descri ing the “ oint investment account” as simply a 
“ cotia c eod oint account” . 
47 Townshend, supra note 3 at para 32. 
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separation.48 Since Mr. Buttar was ultimately ordered to pay an 
equalization payment of $112,986.69 and a $160,000.00 lump 
sum for spousal support, subtracting the value of the milk quota 
from his NFP would have radically revised the outcome Justice 
Hatton reached.49 In fact, there is nothing particularly 
complicated in separating out, notionally, the portion of the milk 
quota that was a gift (if it were a gift). What more meaningfully 
differentiates the quota from the cash gift in Townshend is the 
idea that the quota was used by the family and, as a consequence 
of the family’s activities, the family’s prospects gre . t may not 
e possi le to say that ho  they “used” the mil  quota as the 
direct or sole cause of the quota’s growth to nearly five times its 
initial value. What matters is that there is no clear indication that 
Mr. Buttar “hived off” the mil  quota from the rest of the 
family as if it were a private project for his own benefit all 
those years.  
 
 Thus, with respect to the second issue, even if the 
application judge had not determined that Mr. Buttar's family 
had received consideration in the form of a life interest in the 
farm,50 the actions after the gift has been received should also 
matter. Intentions matter for gifts: essentially, both giver and 
receiver must have the intention to be involved in the transfer of 
a gift. Once it has een received, ho ever, only the receiver’s 
(subsequent) intentions matter. If the receiver should use the gift 
in a clearly private manner, then a case could be made that it 
should be excludable under the FLA, subsection 4(2). But what 
should the presumption be when the gift is not clearly used in an 
“exclusive” manner  urely the correct ans er is that the gift 
                                                 
48 The ratios align in the following way: 5,96027,561  
403,858.02
1,867,572.30 . 
49 I have been unable to find the original decision of Justice Hatton, and 
the appendix of Buttar, supra note 3, only includes “ chedule B”, 
hich sho s ho  the property as divided. resuma ly a “ chedule 
” laid out the  calculations. 
50 Ibid at 26, 33. 
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oins or ecomes “comingled ith” the family property. That is, 
the gift should lose its claim to an independent existence in 
proportion to the degree the donee chooses to treat it that way. 
Clearly, such a presumption would tend to affect fungible gifts 
in specie more than it would discrete items of value such as 
artwork. But is there not a difference between gifting, say, El 
reco’s Adoracíon de los Reyes Magos to an aficionado of 
Renaissance art and giving the same individual money which she 
deposits in her joint investment account?51 Moreover, if the 
painting were sold and the proceeds then deposited in the joint 
investment account, would there be any doubt as to whether that 
sum should e “traced” pursuant to the FLA, subsection 4(2), 
paragraph 5? A recognition of this sort would, moreover, accord 
with the presumption of the “ oint responsi ilities” and “equal 
contri ution” that underlies the purpose of equalization in 
subsection 5(7).52 
 
 In Buttar, it seems as though the right result was reached 
on the milk quota, but for the wrong reasons. The milk quota was 
excluded on the basis that it was not a gift. The parents received 
a life interest in the farm, it is true, but it is not directly or solely 
                                                 
51  Cf Cortina v Cortina, 2014 ONSC 5321 at paras 342 66 (husband 
receives inter vivos gift, deposits it in joint account, but then moves it 
to a private investment account; judge willing to trace the money 
“through the oint account” here it as temporarily “par ed” ithout 
a finding of comingling . ustice afreni re’s decision on the merits 
was upheld on appeal: Cortina v Cortina, 2015 ONCA 750 at paras 
10 20. Unfortunately, the analysis in both decisions also relies, in part, 
on determining the donor’s intentions. 
52   FLA, supra note , s  “ he purpose of this section is to recognize 
that child care, household management and financial provision are the 
joint responsibilities of the spouses and that inherent in the marital 
relationship there is equal contribution, whether financial or otherwise, 
by the spouses to the assumption of these responsibilities, entitling 
each spouse to the equalization of the net family properties, subject 
only to the equita le considerations set out in su section .” 
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in consideration of the milk quota that they acquired this interest. 
In order to connect the life interest to the milk quota, the gift had 
to be included in a larger transaction. In other words, the court 
went behind the (professed) subjective intention of the donors 
and decided that the gift could not be a gift because it was 
“structured” so only for the tax enefits.  
 
 Arguably, this is inconsistent with McNamee, where the 
same court stated in fairly clear terms that the motivation for a 
gift does not matter  “  transfer of property y ay of gift may 
equally be motivated by commercial purposes provided the 
transfer is gratuitous.”53 The situation in Buttar is more 
complicated, to be sure, but it is by no means clear that the gift 
must be included among the larger transaction in such a way as 
to deny the professed understanding of the parties. Surely, had 
the court felt it more just in the circumstances, it would have had 
no trouble at all disaggregating the gift from the rest of the 
transaction and concluding that the consideration was not in 
exchange for the milk quota. In some respects, one might be 
inclined to suggest this conflation of motivation and intention is 
also inconsistent with Ho v. Ho, where Justice Ferrier ruled that 
the husband could not “have it oth ays”  if it as counted as 
a gift for tax purposes, then it should be considered as a gift in 
other contexts as well.54  
 
§. 6. IMPACT OF TOWNSHEND AND BUTTAR 
 
There should be little doubt that both of these decisions work 
against a presumption that the assets of a family should, by 
default, be shared. A more positive spin would be that the rules 
regarding the excludability of gifts is a recognition that spouses 
are still entitled to be individuals and have things of their own. 
                                                 
53 McNamee, supra note 6 at para 37 (overturning the trial judge on this 
point); see also ibid at para 34. 
54 Ho v Ho, supra note 33 at para 19. 
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When it comes to calculating our NFP, after all, we should not 
need to account for every trinket we were given.  
 
 Townshend is concerning for a few reasons. Above all, 
it will encourage divorcing spouses (or their lawyers) to seek to 
claim as many gifts as possible. The fact that one might still 
exclude half the value of the gift even after depositing it in a joint 
bank account (and then split the remaining half) will prove to be 
a strong incentive. Two further consequences follow from this. 
First, if the partners come from different enough economic 
ac grounds, the “ ealthier” spouse may ell insulate many 
assets from equalization. Second, if one spouse has regular or 
more frequent access to lawyers and legal advice, the gift 
exclusion has the potential to benefit the person who is aware of 
it. Indeed, if one can still benefit from three-quarters of the value 
of a gift after depositing it in a joint investment account, then 
there is a strong incentive to track down all the gifts one can.  
   
 The significance of Buttar may seem to temper the 
result of Townshend, but the analysis is also problematic. In 
terms of the impact the decision may have in the future, it is hard 
to say. To be sure, the inconsistency with McNamee is 
concerning. Do the motivations of the donor matter for gifts? If 
they may be discounted against a larger factual background, 
does this mean valuable gifts must be subject to legal formulae 
in order to succeed? It is by no means clear that even 
Declarations of Gift or passing about twigs or clumps of earth 
would suffice if Buttar holds sway.55  
 
 The other problem with Buttar is that it may implicitly 
support the undesirable elements of Townshend. That is, because 
the court decided that the milk quota was not truly a gift, the 
                                                 
55 To be fair, a concern that legal formalities not be a sham is of ancient 
vintage as well. See Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, 
The History of the English Law before the Time of Edward I, 2nd ed 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010) vol 2 at 88. 
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decision does not help answer whether the quota could also be 
excluded in part like the $25,000 in Townshend. In other words, 
it is unclear what it would take for a gift to lose its status as a 
gift other than investing the value of the gift in the matrimonial 
home or squandering it outside the family.56 
 
§. 7. BROADER POLICY ISSUES 
 
The problem gifts pose in the family law context strikes right at 
the heart of what makes the dissolution of a family so tricky a 
matter at law. What was once joined together has come asunder. 
Yet, today we recognize for good reason that there are still two 
individuals at the heart of the marriage. The rightless and 
statusless feme-covert described by Blackstone thankfully no 
longer exists.57 And if marriage consists of two legally 
competent individuals, then there is reason to grant that 
individuals may have things of their own. One can understand 
why gifts should be excluded: they are not directly a contribution 
y the donor  to the “family”. o , to say that individuals 
might have things individually does not mean everything should 
be treated so. And thus the individually-held gift sits on the 
nife’s edge that separates the autonomous individual from the 
common “good” of the family. o ever, it is important to 
remember that when two people marry, it is common to think 
                                                 
56 See e.g. FLA, supra note , s  “ he court may a ard a spouse an 
amount that is more or less than half the difference between the net 
family properties if the court is of the opinion that equalizing the net 
family properties would be unconscionable, having regard to . . . (d) a 
spouse’s intentional or rec less depletion of his or her net family 
property”. 
57 See Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in 
Four Books, Notes selected from the editions of Archibold, Christian, 
oleridge, hitty, te art, err, and Others, Barron ield’s nalysis, 
and Additional Notes, and a Life of the Author by George Sharswood, 
2 vols (Philadelphia: JB Lippincott Co, 1893), online: 
<oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2140#Blackstone_1387-01_763>. 
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that they intend to work together for this common purpose. If 
anything, then, the default presumption should be that things 
belong to the family in all but the clearest cases that the gift was 
treated in an “exclusive” manner. n oth Townshend and Buttar, 
the facts as described suggest that the gifts became family 
possessions. Money invested in a joint investment account and 
an income-generating milk quota both point squarely at the 
family’s enefit.58   
 
 The analysis I have adopted here may seem to some to 
fly in the face of the ct’s provision for “tracing”. Tracing 
allows certain property, including gifts, to be found where it has 
not been irrevocably comingled with other property or the donee 
has not demonstrated an intention to share it with the other 
spouse.59 In an insightful annotation to Berdette v. Berdette, 
Professor McLeod suggested that a purpose of tracing should be 
to encourage families to share their property.60 On this analysis, 
spouses ould e discouraged from “sharing their gifted  
property” if they risk losing the ability to trace the gift and seek 
an exclusion if the marriage should end. I am not persuaded. 
First, subsection 4(3) of the Act is clear that the person seeking 
                                                 
58 Tangible gifts, which hang on the wall or in the closet or sit in a 
garage your Richard Prince Overseas Nurse, your mink coat, your 
Maserati may deserve to be excluded if a gift. But cash and other 
fungibles have less of a claim in that regard because it will often be 
difficult to show that they were for private advantage. 
59  FLA, supra note , s  “ he value of the follo ing property that a 
spouse o ns on the valuation date does not form part of the spouse’s 
net family property: . . . 5. Property, other than a matrimonial home, 
into hich property referred to in paragraphs  to  can e traced.” ee 
also the quotation from Cartier, supra note 45. 
60  Berdette v Berdette (1991), 33 RFL (4th) 290, 1991 CarswellOnt 280 
(WL Can) (Ont CA). The relevant portion of the annotation is 
reproduced by Zylberman & Bruce, supra note 30 at 81 82. 
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the exclusion is obliged to prove it.61 One might reasonably 
expect that the donee ho “shares” a portion of the gift ill have 
a harder time proving the exclusion than the spouse who
jealously or otherwise did not share a portion of the gift but 
kept it fully separate.  
 
 Second, regarding the idea that liberal or lax tracing of 
gifts will encourage sharing, the argument seems aimed at 
family lawyers, academics, legal sophisticates, and, if indeed 
they are a separate group, pessimists. To begin with the last 
group, should we really imagine most people make decisions in 
contemplation of the end of their marriage?62 Alternatively, it is 
also hard to credit that most married people base their decisions 
about how to treat gifts on consideration of the Act. What seems 
more likely instead is that, upon sitting down with a family 
lawyer because the marriage is at an end (or close to it) and 
learning that things can e “traced” in complex ays, people ill 
be inclined to decide that things they thought they had shared 
were not, in the end, actually shared at all. Family money in joint 
investment accounts, perhaps, becomes my money. This is 
especially true if joint investment account monies can be 
recovered at a rate of three quarters on the dollar.  
 
 Finally, from a more philosophical perspective, tracing 
encourages people to privilege the time of the gift (when the 
donor’s intentions matter  and the date of separation hen there 
is a tendency to revise or reinterpret past intentions and actions), 
                                                 
61  FLA, supra note 1, s 4(3). 
62  Presumably, if tracing encourages anyone with respect to gifts, it might 
be wealthy would-be donors who want assurance that their children 
will be able to recover the (value of the) gift when they realize the error 
of their ways and divorce their undeserving spouse. As I argue, these 
concerns are contrary to the spirit of the Act and should be discounted. 
or a radically different perspective, see usan  ea es, “ ifting eal 
Property to Married Children: The Creation of Legal Fictions to Avoid 
Section 4(2) of the Family Law Act”   an am  . 
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and this emphasis comes at the cost of downplaying what 
occurred during the marriage. What matters more than how 
much of the gift is “left” is how it was treated when there was an 
opportunity to use it for the common benefit of the family. The 
doctrine of tracing does not encourage sharing in a family during 
marriage because most people have not heard of it before 
problems arise. What it encourages, in fact, is quite the opposite: 
an increasingly unequal in literal and real world terms
“equalization” of the net family property. This point is 
tautologically true for most people because tracing only comes 
into play when spouses separate. I do not mean to suggest that 
all tracing is wrong, for it serves a useful purpose in the right 
circumstances. But the constraints on tracing I have in mind are 
easily undermined when the starting point of a tracing exercise 
egins ith a donor’s intentions. What happens then is that we 
feel like we should trace the item because the donor wants or 
would have liked us to do so. But as I have argued, what the 
donor wishes at this point is irrelevant.63 
 
 What matters in both cases is how the (would-be) gift 
was treated after being gifted. Both decisions, albeit in different 
ways, evince far too great a concern with the intentions, goals, 
and dreams of the donors. In Townshend there was no good 
reason to do so beyond for determining that a gift had been 
given. For the time after the date of the gift, the court should not 
have let those intentions of the donor colour the interpretation of 
the how the donee acted. In Buttar, the court arguably over-
valued the wider intentions of the donor regarding the milk 
quota if not outright confused motives with intentions. But it 
is more disappointing that the court failed to address how the 
milk quota was clearly used in a non-exclusive manner. 
Regardless of whether a gift was given, it should be clear that it 
lost its excludable “gift status” hen it as used to the general 
                                                 
63  Cf c eod’s annotation to Berdette, supra note  according to “strict 
gift law . . . [a] gift is not unwound simply because the donor's 
expectations did not materialize” . 
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enefit of the family. he significance of a donor’s intentions 
along with his or her actual control should not carry on beyond 
the point at which control is surrendered.  
 
 Ultimately, we might question the wisdom of the 
exclusion provisions in section 4 of the Act. It is somewhat 
strange that the intentions of third parties carry so much weight 
beyond the point of delivery of the gift. At best, it would make 
sense to allow the intention of the donor to carry weight in the 
evaluation of whether an excludable gift has been given, but not 
carry any weight as to whether the gift should be excluded since 
that intention normally ceases to carry any legal weight once 
delivery is completed. And while it is certainly true that FLA, 
subsection 4(2), paragraph , expressly permits a donor’s 
“intention” to carry eight as to hether income derived from 
the gift should also be excluded from the NFP calculation, it 
does not mean that it is certainly right to do so. Even more 
importantly, however, courts must be careful not to privilege the 
intentions of donors, which can be murky enough to ascertain in 
the first place, at the cost of dismissing the overt actions of the 
donees. Otherwise, the courts risk undermining the very purpose 
of the Act itself: to provide for the “equitable settlement of the 
affairs of the spouses upon the rea do n of the partnership”.64  
                                                 
64 FLA, supra note 1, Preamble [emphasis added]. 
